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1 
WILL THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT PREVENT A 
POTENTIAL STATEWIDE AUTO INSURANCE CRISIS? THE 
IMPACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IN 
FISHER V. STATE FARM 
EVAN STEPHENSON AND SHARI L. WALL† 
On May 7, 2015, the Colorado Court of Appeals dramatically 
changed how auto insurers must pay benefits under uninsured and 
underinsured motorist (UIM) policies. In Fisher v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.,1 the court interpreted two general insurance-
penalty statutes enacted in 2008 to require every UIM insurer statewide 
to operate effectively as a first-party health insurance operation.  
After Fisher, UIM insurers must pay covered medical expenses 
caused by auto accidents on a current basis, meaning as the bills accrue. 
While requiring auto insurers to pay like a health insurer, Fisher offers 
them none of the safeguards against runaway costs that health insurers 
enjoy. Predictably, since Fisher, Colorado consumers have seen a 
dramatic spike in auto insurance premiums and the return of the 
inefficiencies that led to the repeal in 2003 of Colorado’s no-fault auto 
insurance system—a legislatively designed piecemeal-payment system 
for auto-accident medical costs.  
The Colorado Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Fisher.2 If 
Fisher is affirmed, the premium spike will likely persist and contribute to 
higher rates of uninsured motorists on Colorado roads. But if Fisher is 
reversed and longstanding UIM law restored, the baleful effects of 
Fisher may retreat.  
I. WHAT IS UIM INSURANCE? 
UIM insurance protects the insured against the risk that an at-fault 
driver who has caused harm may have been “financially irresponsible” 
and failed to carry adequate liability insurance to pay the insured’s 
damages such a medical bills, lost wages, and non-economic damages.3 
“This coverage is designed to place a driver who is injured by an 
uninsured or underinsured motorist in the same position as if the 
uninsured or underinsured motorist had liability limits in amounts equal 
                                                      
† Evan Stephenson is a partner at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP. Mr. Stephenson focuses his 
practice on insurance, tort, and commercial litigation. Shari L. Wall is a paralegal at Wheeler Trigg 
O’Donnell LLP. The authors would like to thank Terence M. Ridley, Kayla L. Scroggins & Dana 
Stiles for their assistance. 
1 No. 13CA2361, 2015 WL 2198515 (Colo. App. May 7, 2015), cert. granted, State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, No. 15SC472, 2016 WL 3207869 (Colo. June 6, 2016). 
2 State Farm, 2016 WL 3207869, at *1. 
3 Kral v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 784 P.2d 759, 765 (Colo. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-
4-609 to -610 (2016). 
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to the insured’s coverage.”4 UIM insurance allows the injured party to 
make a claim against his or her own insurance company to receive the 
same payment he or she would have recovered from the at-fault driver if 
the driver had carried adequate liability insurance.5 The coverage is paid 
when the insured proves liability and damages, in the same manner that 
an injured party proves a tort case against an at-fault driver.6 Because 
making a UIM claim involves proving up liability and damages to one’s 
own insurer, UIM insurance necessarily causes the insurance company 
and the insured to be adverse.7 
UIM coverage is typically paid like liability insurance—all at once 
pursuant to a settlement or judgment. In the Supreme Court’s words, 
Colorado UIM coverage gives “Coloradans the opportunity to recover 
compensation for losses from their UIM insurer ‘in the same manner’ 
and ‘to the same extent’ as they would recover for such losses from a 
tortfeasor who was insured in amounts equal to the insured’s UIM 
coverage.”8 Accordingly, UIM insurance policies commonly provide that 
the insurance company will pay out the coverage as they do in liability 
cases, meaning all at once under a settlement, judgment, or arbitration 
award.9 
In light of these considerations, insurance companies tend to equip 
their UIM claim professionals with the same types of tools for claim 
handling that they would provide to adjusters handling liability claims, as 
opposed to the more elaborate medical-management apparatus employed 
in health or workers-compensation insurance. 
                                                      
4 USAA v. Parker, 200 P.3d 350, 358 (Colo. 2009); see also Sunahara v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 280 P.3d 649, 657 (Colo. 2012). 
5 See Kral, 784 P.2d at 763–65. 
6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brekke, 105 P.3d 177, 187–88 (Colo. 2004) (noting that UIM 
coverage “applies only if the insured is ‘legally entitled’ to damages” and “a finding of no liability or 
of limited damages on the part of the uninsured motorist will eliminate or limit a claim under the 
insurance provider’s UM coverage”); Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 487, 493 
(Colo. 1998) (holding that the insured “has the burden to prove liability and damages”). 
7 Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo. App. 1992). 
8 USAA, 200 P.3d at 353 (emphasis added); see also id. at 359 (noting that Colorado Supreme 
Court precedent “has emphasized that the purpose of the UM/UIM statute is to provide Coloradans 
with the opportunity to ‘gain compensation [within policy limits] for loss due to the negligent 
conduct of non-insured motorists in the same manner as the insured would be compensated for loss 
due to the negligent conduct of insured motorists’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Kral, 784 P.2d 
at 762); id. (“[T]he legislature intended that an injured insured recover ‘in the same manner’ and ‘to 
the same extent’ in either case.”) (quoting Kral, 784 P.2d at 763). 
9 See, e.g., Williams v. Owners Ins. Co., 621 F. App’x 914, 918 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting UIM 
policy: “Whether an injured person is legally entitled to recover damages and the amount of such 
damages shall be determined by an agreement between the injured person and us.”); Sidney v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 187 P.3d 443, 449 (Alaska 2008) (quoting UIM policy: “[T]he right to benefits and 
the amount payable will be decided by agreement between the insured person and Allstate. If an 
agreement can’t be reached, the decision will be made by arbitration.”) (alteration in original). 
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II. COLORADO’S EXPERIENCE WITH A NO-FAULT PIECEMEAL-PAYMENT 
SYSTEM FOR PAYING MEDICAL COSTS FROM AUTO ACCIDENTS 
Because UIM insurance is fault-based insurance that is typically 
paid all at once under a settlement or a judgment, it fundamentally differs 
from insurance coverage that pays as losses accrue, in a piecemeal 
fashion. From 1974 to 2003, Colorado experimented with a no-fault 
insurance system requiring payment of medical bills and other damages 
from auto accidents as they accrued.10 Under Colorado’s No-Fault Act, 
insurers were required to make periodic payments of medical bills 
incurred as a result of car accidents in a piecemeal fashion.11 
The no-fault piecemeal-payment system resulted in high premiums 
and medical costs that decreased only after General Assembly repealed 
the No-Fault Act in 2003.12 According to a February 18, 2008 study 
prepared for the Colorado governor, the “average auto insurance 
premiums in Colorado decreased 35 percent in the period July 2003 to 
December 2007,” in the period following the repeal of the piecemeal-
payment system.13 In the last full year of that system in 2002, Colorado 
had the ninth most expensive auto insurance in the U.S., but two years 
after its repeal Colorado was ranked number twenty-one.14 
Colorado’s experience with a piecemeal-payment system of medical 
costs resembles the experiences of other states. A study by the RAND 
Corporation of such systems concluded that their excessive cost is 
“driven primarily by medical costs.”15 Auto insurers are poorly equipped 
to control rising costs in a piecemeal-payment system that is essentially 
“a first-party health-insurance operation.” 16  The result is runaway 
medical expenses and, in turn, skyrocketing premiums: “Total injury 
costs per insured vehicle gradually began to diverge across systems in 
the late 1980s, with no-fault becoming substantially more expensive than 
tort.”17 “Medical treatment in no-fault states was vastly more expensive 
than in other states.”18 Claimants making piecemeal-payment claims saw 
more, and more types of, medical providers, but even “the same medical 
care costs more to the auto-insurance system in no-fault states than in tort 
                                                      
10  BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, AUTO INSURANCE/TRAUMA SYSTEM STUDY: STATE OF 
COLORADO 1 (2008). 
11 LaBerenz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Under § 10-4-
706(1)(b) of the No-Fault Act, insurers are required to pay reasonable and necessary expenses for 
medical care performed within five years after an accident . . . . Under § 10-4-706(1) of the No-Fault 
Act, an insurer has thirty days to pay benefits after receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount 
of expenses incurred.”); 3 C.C.R. § 702-5:5-2-8(4)(B) (repealed 2016). 
12 Miller v. Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 929 (Colo. App. 2009) (piecemeal-payment system repealed 
in 2003); BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, supra note 11, at 1 (reduction in premium costs). 
13 BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING, supra note 11, at 5. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 JAMES M. ANDERSON, PAUL HEATON & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH 
NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 143 (2010). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at xv; id. at xvi (“No-fault’s high claim costs are the result of very high medical costs.”). 
18 Id. at xv. 
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states” that do not institute piecemeal-payment requirements. 19 
Piecemeal-payment systems inflate medical costs. 
In 2015, when Fisher was decided, Colorado had abandoned a 
system of piecemeal-payment of medical costs arising from auto 
accidents. Premiums had come down for a time, making insurance more 
affordable in Colorado. 
III. FISHER INTERPRETS THE 2008 PENALTY STATUTES TO REQUIRE UIM 
POLICIES TO PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES AS THEY ACCRUE  
In May 2015, Fisher judicially re-imposed a system of piecemeal-
payment of medical costs resulting from car accidents.20 To reinstitute a 
piecemeal-payments regime, the court of appeals relied on two general 
insurance-penalty statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and -1116 
(Penalty Statutes), that were enacted and made effective in 2008.21 
The Penalty Statutes provide that “[a] person engaged in the 
business of insurance shall not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a 
claim for benefits owed to or on behalf of any first-party claimant.”22 “If 
a claim for payment of benefits has been unreasonably delayed or denied, 
the claimant ‘may bring an action . . . to recover reasonable attorney fees 
and court costs and two times the covered benefit.’”23 
Although the statutes state unequivocally that the delay of a “claim” 
may create liability, Fisher concluded that a penalty may be assessed 
based on “a duty to pay some of the claim that is not reasonably in 
dispute”24 including “one component of a UIM claim . . . .”25 To find 
such a “duty to pay some” of a “claim,”26 the court relied on the 
“standard of reasonableness”27 from the Penalty Statutes, which consists 
of one word (“unreasonably”), to conclude that that “under section 10-3-
1115, State Farm was legally obligated to not unreasonably delay or deny 
payment of [the insured’s] medical expenses, notwithstanding that other 
components of his UIM claim may have been subject to reasonable 
dispute.”28 
The court of appeals further held that consumers and insurers 
cannot opt out of the piecemeal-payment system in their insurance 
                                                      
19 Id. 
20 Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 13CA2361, 2015 WL 2198515, at *3–7 (Colo. 
App. May 7, 2015). 
21 Id. 
22 COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1115(1)(a) (2016). 
23 Fisher, 2015 WL 2198515, at *2 (quoting § 10-3-1116(1)). 
24 Id. at *5. 
25 Id. at *6. 
26 Id. at *5. 
27 Id. at *6. 
28 Id. at *7. 
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contracts. Any language attempting to opt out of the partial-payment 
regime is “unenforceable.”29 
Fisher did not simply require UIM insurers to make piecemeal 
payments, it also prohibited them from relying on existing insurance 
regulations for guidance.30 The court of appeals required insurers to 
operate a piecemeal-payment system but without the detailed regulations 
and instructions necessary to operate such an inherently complex 
compensation system. The court of appeals held that the word 
“unreasonable” from the Penalty Statutes adequately guides insurers in 
managing an ongoing piecemeal-payment system that must compensate 
(i) insureds, (ii) lawyers, and (iii) healthcare providers, all of whom may 
have competing claims or liens on insurance proceeds. 
IV. THE MEDIA NOTICES A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN AUTO INSURANCE 
PREMIUMS IN 2016 AND 2017 
Not long after Fisher, Colorado auto insurance premiums began to 
spike. The media noticed. “Who, What’s To Blame For Spiking Auto 
Insurance Costs?,” asked a headline on June 20, 2016.31 These media 
stories reported substantial increases that were greater than the increases 
seen in traditionally high-cost insurance states such as California (7% 
increase) and Florida (10% increase).32 In January 2017, more stories 
appeared identifying still further substantial increases in six-month auto 
insurance premiums.33 
In media reports, some consumers called the increases 
“[o]utrageous,” “unfair,” and “[o]ver the top.”34 Even low-risk drivers 
who had received no traffic citations and been involved in no accidents 
for years saw substantial premium increases. 35  Unfortunately, the 
journalists who produced the stories did not interview legal experts to 
determine the effect of legal changes on insurance rates. As a result, their 
stories ignored the potentially powerful effect of legal rules on insurance 
rates and premiums.36 
                                                      
29 Id. at *6 n.2. 
30 Id. at *6. 
31 Brian Maass, Who, What’s to Blame for Spiking Auto Insurance Costs?, CBS DENVER (June 
20, 2016), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2016/06/20/spiking-auto-insurance-costs/. 
32 Whitney Wild, Colorado Car Insurance Jumps 15% on Average, 9NEWS (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.9news.com/money/personal-finance/consumer/colorado-car-insurance-jumps-15-on-
average/251394618. 
33 E.g., Ashley Michels, Colorado Car Insurance Rates Increasing 15 Percent or More, FOX31 
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://kdvr.com/2017/01/31/colorado-car-insurance-rates-increasing-15-or-more/. 
34 Maass, supra note 32. 
35 Id. 
36 The effect of the law on premiums has been acknowledged by the Colorado Supreme Court. 
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Stresscon Corp., 370 P.3d 140, 144 (Colo. 2016) (noting that 
legal rules governing insurers have “important practical implications for the risks that insurers 
undertake and the premiums that insureds pay”); Craft v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 343 P.3d 951, 961 
(Colo. 2015) (noting expansion of insurer obligations causes insurers to, “out of necessity, increase 
their premiums”). 
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V. DATA FROM DIVISION-OF-INSURANCE RATE FILINGS SHOWS A SPIKE 
IN PREMIUM THAT COINCIDES WITH FISHER 
Data from the Colorado Division of Insurance supports the 
conclusion that Fisher is responsible for a premium spike. A search of 
publicly available data from the Colorado Division of Insurance rate 
filings from seven of Colorado’s largest auto insurers by market share 
confirms a premium spike that coincides with Fisher. The authors 
searched for UIM rate-increase data at the Colorado Division of 
Insurance and located such data since Fisher for seven of the top ten auto 
insurers by market share:  
(i) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm),  
(ii) Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers),  
(iii) American Family Mutual Insurance Company (AmFam),  
(iv) GEICO Casualty Company (GEICO),  
(v) Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate),  
(vi) United Services Automobile Association (USAA), and  
(vii) USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA CIC).  
These auto insurers occupy 49.8% of the relevant insurance 
market.37 Table 1 below sets forth these insurers’ publicly available data 
for UIM rate increases since Fisher. 
Table 1: Colorado UIM Rate Increases Since Fisher For Seven Large Insurers 
(Source: Colorado Division of Insurance public rate filings) 
Insurer Name Date of Data Increase Since Fisher 
State Farm December 21, 2015 15.00% 
Farmers April 6, 2016 31.20% 
AmFam May 1, 2016 6.50% 
GEICO February 25, 2016 13.40% 
Allstate December 26, 2015 17.50% 
USAA March 28, 2016 12.00% 
USAA CIC March 28, 2016 30.00% 
Average 17.94% 
The average of the Table 1 percentage-increase figures is 17.94% 
over a period of fifteen months or less. Figure 1 below graphically 
illustrates these UIM rate increases: 
                                                      
37 Division of Insurance Documents are on file with the Denver Law Review. 




An average increase of 17.94% (or 14.35% per year), held constant 
over time, would cause UIM insurance rates to double in approximately 
five years. These increases are alarming. 
These data strongly indicate that the UIM increases did not result 
from the general litigation or insurance climates in Colorado but rather 
from UIM-specific changes in the last fifteen months. Only the impact of 
Fisher credibly explains these increases. To test whether these increases 
resulted from Fisher, the authors gathered from the Division of Insurance 
post-Fisher data on the increase in overall auto insurance rates38 for the 
same insurers from Table 1 over the same time period. Table 2 compares 
the large increases in UIM rates to the much smaller increases in overall 
auto insurance rates over the same period and for the same insurers. 
Table 2: UIM versus Overall Auto Insurance Rate Increases Since Fisher  
(Source: Colorado Division of Insurance public rate filings) 
Insurer 
Name 





State Farm Dec. 21, 2015 5.10% 15.00% 9.90% 
Farmers April 6, 2016 8.09% 31.20% 23.11% 
AmFam May 1, 2016 4.00% 6.50% 2.50%  
GEICO Feb. 25, 2016 2.90% 13.40% 10.50% 
Allstate Dec. 26, 2015 9.90% 17.50% 7.60% 
USAA March 28, 2016 5.00% 12.00% 7.00% 
USAA CIC March 28, 2016 9.00% 30.00% 21.00% 
Average 6.28% 17.94% 11.66% 
As shown by Table 2 above, each and every one of the auto insurers 
whose post-Fisher rates was determined based on public data had a 
greater increase in UIM rates than overall auto rates. The overall auto 
rates increased an average of only 6.28%, as compared to an average 
                                                      
38 “Overall auto rates” includes auto coverages other than UIM bodily injury coverage, such as 
liability, collision, property-damage coverage, and so on. 
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increase of 17.94% in UIM rates. Figure 2 below graphically illustrates 
the rate data from Table 2. 
 
As shown above in Figure 2 and Table 2, the difference between 
overall auto and UIM rate increases since Fisher is large and striking—
an average difference of 11.66%. Thus, the difference between the 
average UIM and general increases is itself almost double the average 
size of the general increases. The magnitude of these differences points 
to a UIM-specific cause in the last approximate fifteen months, and the 
only credible explanation is Fisher. These data indicate that Fisher has 
caused a dramatic UIM rate spike within a short time period. 
Rate spikes, such as the one illustrated above in Tables 1 and 2 and 
Figures 1 and 2, harm consumers and the entire insurance system on 
which the public depends. Rate spikes increase the cost and 
unavailability of insurance, and they destabilize the system at a basic 
level. This is because the “more narrowly risk pools can be defined, the 
more broadly insurance can be offered in the society.”39  
VI. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING 
FISHER 
These data provide persuasive evidence that Fisher has already had 
a baleful effect on the Colorado insurance market. There is no basis to 
believe that the UIM rate spike that Colorado is currently experiencing 
will spontaneously level off. It may grow worse, because, as explained 
above, Fisher prohibits insurers and consumers from relying on 
                                                      
39 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1545 (1987). 
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regulation or opting out. And Fisher does not provide UIM insurers with 
the tools that other insurers have to control medical costs or otherwise 
manage expenses. When rates increase in this manner, the number of 
Coloradans unable to afford car insurance rises and the uninsured 
motorist population expands, leading to greater instability in the auto 
insurance marketplace. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has accepted Fisher for certiorari 
review. If the Supreme Court reverses, Colorado’s prior experience with 
no-fault insurance teaches that the premium spike, and its other 
consequences, can be reversed. 
